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By that time the first of the histories of the Revolution had appeared. One of them estimated the total loss of life at 2,022,903, including 800,000 dead on the field of battle, 184,000 Europeans and slaves in the colonies and 900,000 in the Vendée. It claimed that 4,790 people had committed suicide 'out of terror' and that 3,400 women had died in premature labour, not to mention the 1,550 'driven mad' by the Revolution.
2 Like that of the Marquise de Créquy, this perspective was jaundiced, again for understandable reasons. Certainly the figures of deaths were fanciful: those for war losses and the Vendée must be halved, at least. But there was indeed the reality of massive numbers of premature deaths and wrecked lives: it has been estimated, for example, that half of the 30,000 volunteers and conscripts from the department of the Aisne were dead by 1799.
3 Across the revolutionary decade some two million men were to serve in the army: some 7 per cent of the population and about one-third of all adult men. About one-third of families were directly affected by the departure of a son or husband for the army.
These grim conclusions might suggest that the major changes wrought by the French Revolution in the lives of the rural and urban masses were premature death for many and sullen disappointment for the rest. A Revolution which had begun in 1789 with boundless hopes for a golden era of political liberty and social change had ended in 1799 with a military seizure of power. In the process, French people had had to endure a decade of political instability, civil war and armed conflict with the rest of Europe, at the cost of many hundreds of thousands of lives. For the people who inhabited France's country towns and villages, was life in 1799 essentially the same as in 1789, except for the 'punishment' that the Marquise felt was so well merited? How 'revolutionary' had been the experience of a decade of Revolution?
François Furet and others have argued that, well into the nineteenth century, French society and the economy remained much as it had under the Ancien Régime. In Furet's words, 'nothing resembled French society under Louis XVI more than French society under Louis-Philippe '. These historians have argued that the essentials of daily life emerged largely unchanged: especially patterns of work, the position of the poor, social inequalities and the inferior status of women. France remained a land dominated in every way by an élite of noble and bourgeois landowners. 4 Such a view of the significance of the French Revolution cannot do justice to the social importance of this protracted upheaval. No French adult alive in 1799 was in any doubt that they had lived through a revolutionary upheaval, willingly or resentfully, and that the society in which they lived was fundamentally different. A consideration of the social significance of the Revolution from a longer-term perspective suggests that this was no illusion.
This was, in the first place, a revolution in perceptions of identity. By the end of the decade, French people made sense of the world around them in radically different ways. The most revolutionary transformation of the French Revolution -indeed, of any revolution -was that from subject to citizen. The assumption that the sovereign will lay in a body politic of citizens rather than in a hierarchy of appointment speaks of an irreversible transformation of political culture. The evaporation by 1792 of the mystique of divine-right monarchy was the most fundamental shift in popular understandings of power. Even the seizure of power by Napoleon in 1799 and the restoration of monarchy in 1814 could not reverse assumptions of citizenship, even if democratic republicanism could be outlawed.
5 Henceforth the place of monarchy within a political structure was to be a matter for political debate and division, not -as before 1789 -an element of mentalité.
Collective practices in thousands of clubs, section meetings and 41,000 local councils introduced millions of people to the language and forms of popular sovereignty. Of course, it may be countered that this was mere verbiage, that people had picked up the new vocabulary as verbal fashion, that the words were devoid of substance. This assumes that language is no more than the words in which thoughts are made verbal, rather than defining how people think. If the latter is the case, then the language of rights, freedom, sovereignty and equality expressed a change in consciousness.
Not only had the democratization of politics introduced unprecedented numbers of people to the practice also of popular sovereignty, but this
